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Article 5

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
A'TORNEY AND CLIENT.-Disbarment Proceedings.An information sought the disbarment of an attorney from the
Chicago Bar Association for alleged malpractice and gross inattention to his clients' interests. Despite his twenty years experience
at the Bar of that city, he was involved in professional misconduct
toward two of his clients, as indicated in the two counts of this information.
The first count stated that a Miss McWhorter, who was a washerwoman, employed him as counsel to represent her in two suits,
one, for services rendered, and another for an assault and battery.
The attorney received the sum of $500 in settlement of these judgments, and by borrowing additional money from his client, he held
the sum of $605, which he failed to pay over to her on demand.
According to the second count, a Mrs. Morrison had beer advised to sue her husband for divorce, for which she advanced a sum
of money. Arrangement was made with the husband to pay certain
additional attorney's fees and also to set aside a ce-tain sum for the
support of their child. The husband paid $50.00 to the attorney,
but a bill for divorce was never filed in accordance with the agreement. Oliver M. Olson, the attorney in the case, defends himself
on the grounds of being busily engaged in the prosecution of important suits in Wisconsin which kept him out of the state most of the
time.
The petitioners, it must be noted, sought only the money due
them and did not ask the court for disbarment proceedings to be instituted. The Bar of the City of Chicago interfered and returned
a rule for striking Olson's name off the roll, in this well reasoned
'case of People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association,v. Olson, 153 N. E.
348. The vigilance of an able Bar in detecting practices involving
questionable conduct of one of its members is to be commended in
this decision of the Supreme Court of that state.
When an attorney abuses that trust and betrays those interests
so charged upon him as an officer of the court, he no longer merits
the confidence of his clients, and is no longer entitled to be held out
to the public as a lawyer to whom legal difficulties might be submitted. This rule was laid down in People v. Grusd, 318 111. 44,
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148 N. E. 860, and is the fundamental doctrine on which the'entire
relationship of attorney and client is based. Upon the enforcement
of such a rule, depends the integrity of the Bar.
The logical thing for Olsen to have done, instead of avoiding
his duty, was either to have refused the case at the start, or to have
assigned it to some other member of the Bar, who could give it the
time and the attention which the facts of the case merited. Because
of his failure to do this, Olsen's defense falls by the wayside.
S. W.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-:-The rights of the mortgagee in
a confiscated automobile. The mortgagee of a car seized while
transporting intoxicating liquors cannot assert his claim against the
car itself after forfeiture but must look to the proceeds of the sale
for payment of his claim even though he had no knowledge of the
illegal use to which the car was put. The court- held that it was not
the intent of the legislature to forfeit the interest of the- offending
party but only the res.- the car itself. The City of Findlay et al v.
Associates Investment Co., 115 Ohio State 185.
In White Auto Co. v. Collins, 206 -S.W. 748, the court held the
vendor, who retained iitle and had no knowledge of any illegal'use,
could not recover the car forfeited because the vendee transported
liquor therein. The court declared the car when so used was a
nuisance and the forfeiture is of the car itself, In State v. Peterson,
193 Pac. 342, the court, interpreting a similar statute, found no intent to protect the interest of a'bona fide mortgagee from forfeiture.
King v. Commonwealth, 102 S. E. 757, and Pennington v; Commonwealth, 102 S. E. 758, hold that the interest of the bona fide mortgagee is subordinate to the right of the state to have such cars forfeited. In State v. Stephens, 198 Pac. 1087, the court found that
the forfeiture of the mortgagee's interest was merely intident to the
effective execution of the forfeiture declared by the statute. In
State v. Paige touring car, 115 Atl. 275, the court said, "It would
render such a statute practically impotent-to give it a construction
under -which a claimanft, however small, having established his lack
of knowledge of or consent to the unlawful use, could by the proof
of his claim rescue also the interests of the guilty therein from the
operation of the law." In State v. Peterson,supra, the court-said,
"Doubtless the legislature realized -that any provision for the pro-
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tection of a lien of a mortgagee would open the door -to collusion,
* * * * and any person desiring to engage in illegal transportation of
intoxicating liquors could, by placing an incumbrance upon an automobile, minimize the financial investment and hazard of the business."
L.C.
CRIMES AND OFFENSES--False Oath.-In a prosecution for
suborning person 'to testify falsely before a referee in a bankruptcy proceeding, the uncorroborated testimony of the person
alleged to have been induced to testify falsely is insufficient, as
against the defendant, to establish the falsity of the oath alleged
as perjury without which there should be no -subornation of perjury. Hammer v. United States (U. S. Sup. Ct.), 7 Am. B. R.

(N. S.) 783.
DIVORCE.-The petitioner predicated his suit for divorce
on the grounds of desertion. He had met -his wife while he was a
soldier, and she, a nurse. There followed a swift courtship which
soon culminated in a marriage and the groom took his bride to the
house of his parents where they shared quarters with his' folks and a
brother and his wife. Two families may have been company but
three was a crowd in that house, however spacious it may have been.
Into these surroundings the happy bride hopefully 'entered, little
knowing, perhaps never thinking, of the inevitable sorrow that
awaited her arrival.
A recital of. the incidents that followed and the attendant unhappiness only serves to illustrate the well-known consequences that
befall a, young groom who thoughtlessly disregards the Scriptural
admonition, "For this cause shall a man leave father and mother and
cleave to his wife, and the twain shall be one flesh". The desultory
disposition of exceedingly interested "in-laws" paying too much
respect to their inquisitive complex and too little respect to the confines of their intellect; the caustic remarks of ineddling parefits-inlaw" and many other proverbial digressions, by newly acquired kin*folk, from the conventional path of rectitude were the misfortunes
of the petitioner's wife when she undertook a residence at the house
of his father.
With the expectation of a new arrival the wife expressed her
wish to return to her mother for care and comfort during the period
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of confinement. After the baby was born and the mother had sufficiently regained her strength to make the trip, the petitioner wrote
a letter requesting her to rejoin him. She replied that it would be
impossible for her to live under the same circumstances to which
she had been subjected, but expressed her willingness to reassume
her matrimonial duties if he provided a home of their own. Desertion was alleged by the husband from the date of this reply, although
subsequent letters from the wife abound in evidence of an undying
love and adoration of her spouse. Under this state of facts the
court held there was no desertion because the husband could not
predicate desertion on her refusal to return and subjecf herself to
unhappiness, interference, ill treatment, and abuse. Thomsen v.
Thomsen (Sup. Ct. Ore. 1926), 247 Pac. 808.
"At common law the husband had the right to fix the matrimonial domicile anywhere in the world and the wife's refusal to
follow him constituted desertion." 15 Col. L. Rev. 277, 278, citing:
1 Nelson, Divorce .and Separation, sec. 68. This doctrine has been
followed in varying degrees by not a few courts. Franklin v. Franklin, 190 Mass. 349, 77 N. E. 48, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 145 5 Ann. Cas.
851; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 87 Ill. 250; Hunt v. Hunt, 29 N. J. Eq.
96; Messenger v. Messenger, 56 Mo. 329. However, the modem
tendency is in, accord with the principal case, to the effect that although a husband has the right to choose the domicile, he must show
reasonable consideration for the wife's welfare, health, comfort,
safety and happiness. Bell v; Bell, (Idaho) 96 Pac. 196; Hall v.
Hall, 69 W. Va. 175, 71 S. E. 103, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 758; Marshak
v. Marshak, 115 Ark. 51 170 S. W. 567, L. R. A. 1915 E. 161, 19
C. J. 60; 9 R. C. L. 365; 15 Col. L. Rev. 277, 278; 33 Harv. L. Rev.
112. Under this .doctrine a husband cannot place his wife among
relatives who interfere with her happiness, safety, or comfort.
Powell v. Powell, 29 Vt. 148; Field v. Field, 139 N. Y. S. 673, 79
Misc. 557; Hoffhines v. Hoffhines, (Md. 1924), 126 Atl. 112, 38
A. L. R. 332 (well annotated). The Hoffhines case hints that the
husband's financial ability to provide a separate home might be a
controlling.fact. The recent case, Crouch v. Crouch (Md. 1926),
133 Atl. 725, holds that a wife is justified in refusing to live with
her husband in a house where he insists on keeping an insane relative, and she may set up a separate domicile. Nor is a wife guilty
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of desertion in refusing to follow her husband to a foreign country
according t6 the weight of authority. 19 C. J. 60.
W. L. T.
EXEMPTIONS-Bankrupt Holding Property Under Land
Contract Is Ertitled to Homestead Exemption as Owner.Bankrupt entered into possession of lands under a written contract for the purchase thereof, paying part in cash and agreeing
to pay balance in monthly installments. A provision that upon
failure to pay any two installments the seller might abrogate the
contract and retain all sums received as rent, but in notes given
for defferred payments it was provided that upon failure to pay
any two installments the balance should become immediately
due. Held that the notes modified the contract so that the seller
could no longer enforce the forfeiture and that the bankrupt was
the owner of the property within the provision of the state constitution allowing a "homestead, bona fide, owned by the debtor and
occupied by him." Le Blanc v. Watson ( C. C. A., 5th Cir.), 8 Am.
B. R. (N. S.) 1.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-Right of wife to maintain action
against husband for personal injury caused by his negligent
act.--Plaintiff brought an action against her husband to recover
for- injuries sustained as the result of his negligent operation of
the automobile in which she was riding. Defendant demurred
and the question was raised whether the wife was given such a
right to recover under .section 11245 of the general code of Ohio
which provides, "A married woman shall sue and be sued as if
she were unmarried, and her husband be joined with her only
when the cause of action is in favor of or against both". Held,
under the code the wife could niot maintain an action against her
husband for personal injuries resulting from his negligence.
Leonardi v. Leonardi, (Ct. App. Lake Co. Ohio, 1925) 153 N. E. 93.
Pollock, J., in a well considered opinion of the rights conferred
on the wife by that section of the Ohio code involved, states,
"It does not purport to create any new grounds of recovery in
the wife which did not exist at common law, but only to enable the wife to maintain an action in her own name, which prior
to the code must have been brought in the joint name of the husband and wife". He further- pointed out that the common law
rule preventing the husband froth m-aintaining such an action
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against his wife, remains unchanged and goes on to say, "The
legislature will not be held to intend a repeal of the settled rules
of common law, unless the language employed by it clearly imports such an intention". The court was mindful of the fact that
any rule of law to the contrary would jeopgrdize the tranquility
of our most precious sphere of influence, our most wholesome
governmental unit, the home; and warns us of the dire consequences of such a drastic change of law which could scarcely
have been within contemplation of the legislature when they
passed the act referred to above.
By the weight of authority, under the Married Women's
-Acts of the various states the wife is given no right to sue her
husband for a tort committed by him during coverture. Thompson
v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 54 L. ed. 1180, 30 L. R. A. ( N. S.)
1153, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 21 Ann. Cas. 921; Peters v. Peters, 42
Iowa 182; Libby v. Berry, 74 Me. 286, 43 Am. Rep. 289; Bandfield
A. 1917 B, 774, Ann. Cas. 1818 C 772.
A husband cannot and never could bring action against his
wife for a personal tort committed by her against him during coverture. Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N. W. 1047, 6 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 191. :In the annotation to Johnson v. Johnson, 6 A. L. R.
1031, 1044 the reason for the general rule that a wife has no right
of action against her husband are set forth. Among these is
public policy forbidding the impairment of domestic tranquility
and the airing of domestic troubles in public. Other remedies
are open to the wife, in criminal prosecutions, and in divorce,
separation, and alimony for wrongs done to her by her husband.
The object of the statutes ig to place the wife on an equality as
to the right to sue and the statutes generally disclose no intention
to confer on the wife greater rights than possessed by the husband. Since the husband never could sue his wife, the object of
equality cannot be ignored nor rights created which are not reciprocal. The object of the Statutes being to place the wife on
an equal footing, and the statute being silent on the matter of
creating rights which the husband does not possess; it is only
reasonable to conclude that it was not intended by the legislature to be so bold in its enactment as to change the countenance
of the established common law status of husband and wife.
Quoting the court in Bandfield v. Bandfield, supra, we submit:
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"The legislature should s eak in no Uncertain manner when it
seeks to abrogate the plain and long established rules of common
law. Courts "should not be left to construction to sustain such
bold innovations."
For further, discussion see 1 No=E DAmR
LAwYER 195, and 24 MICH. LAw Rav. 618.
W. L. T.
NUISANCES.--Isolation Hospitals.--The city of Pasadena
established, by ordinance, a certain block of land owned'by and
situate in said city as'a suitable site for an- isolation hospital,
under .the direction of the health department 'of the city. The
several suits were instituted by the several plaintiffs, *ho
were the owners of property adjacent to the block selected for
the h6spital, to enjoin the construction and maintenance of the hospital, and the plaintiffs pursued their case upon the theory that the
very traditional dread of infectious disease and the attendant psychology would so annoy them and depredate the value of their land
as to give them the right to the injunction they sought, notwithstanding that there might be no actual danger of infection. The supreme
court of California held that mere fear of -such danger would not
suffice to warrant the issuance of an injunction. Jardine v. City of
Pasadena (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1926) 248 P. 225.
In actions to. restrain a dangerous nuisance, the English courts
have established the probability of actual harm as the test, appar-.
ently disregarding fear which results from the danger as a ground
for relief. Crowder v. Tinkler (1816) 19 Ves 617; Atty. v. Nottingham L. R. (1904) 1 Ch. 673; Fleet v. Metropolitan A. yluni
Board 2 .T. L. Rep. 361. American authorities, however, havegope
further, granting an injunction regardless of the extent or the certainty of the danger, when the fear excited is a reasonable one.
Stotler v. Rochelle (Kan. 1916) 109 P. 788. 'The traditional dread
of cancer has been presented by the supreme court of Maryland in
a scholarly exposition, a veritable classic on the premises, and a frequently quoted case, insisting that fear alone ought to suffice in such
notoriously communicable diseases to constitute sufficient cause for
injunction against hospitals treating the diseases in residential districts, the solemn assurances of science to the contrary notwithstanding. Baltimore City v. Fairfield Imp. Co. 87 Md. 352, 39 Atl. 1081,
1084, 40 L. R. A. 494, 67 Am. St. Rep. 344. But the American
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courts, by no means confine this theory to cancer. It has been held,
also, that the maintenance of a tuberculosis sanatorium in a residential district, for example, which robbed adjoining property owners of their enjoyment of their homes, and depreciated their value
to about 50 per cent because of fear of disease, which experts regard a§ resting in pure imagination, is a nuisance, under a statute
defining a nuisance to be unlawfully doing any act which injures or
endangers the comfort of others, although the sanatorium was in
fact not a menace to the health of those living in the vicinity. Everett
v. Paschall,61 Wash. 47, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 827, 111 P. 879, Ann.
Cases 1912B, 1128. But this is by no means the unanimous disposition of our courts. In fact, there is an irreconcilable difference of
opinion among the authorities as to the right of a property holder
to object to the location and maintenance of a hospital for the treatment of dangerously contagious diseases so near his property as to
work him unmistakable injury. Barry v. Smith, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1028, note. Without unduly taking refuge in this authority, the
theory of the principal case may well be sustained against the cases
cited above, by other American cases where it has been held that "if
no real danger exists, the mere fact that uninformed people who are
unacquainted with the true conditions may assume such a danger
exists, cannot be made the basis of equitable relief. Health v North
American Home, (1910), 77 N. J. EQ. 464, 78 Atl. 677. Again
New Jersey affirmed this view in City of Northfield v. Board of
Health, 85 N. J. EQ. 47, 95 Ati. 745 (1915) So., it was held that
there must be a real danger, otherwise, however much the hospital
might be deemed an annoyance, no injunction could be obtained, in
Heaton v. Packer, 131 App. Div. 812, 116 N. Y. Supp. 46 (1909).
But, vigorotisly as it may be asserted that the principal case indicates the modem tendency, neither that, nor the weight of opinion,
after all, is so palpable; unfavorable as may be the contrast of our
indecision with the calm and settled conviction of the English courts.
F. R.
SALES-WAIVER OF WARRANTY BY ACCEPTANCE.Under a contract to manufacture castings according to certain
patterns and specifications furnished by the buyer, which contained provisions that the castings should be free from defects
and that.before acceptance they should be inspected by the buy-
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er or his agent held that no warranty as to patent defects will survive inspection and acceptance by the buyer. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
Co. v. Pittsburgh Steel Foundry Co., 153 N. E. 201, (Ohio 1926).
This decision follows the leading case of Reed v. Randall, 86 Am.
Dec. 305 and is supported by Columbus & Hocking Coal & Iron Co.
v. See, 135 N. W. 920. Although this view seems to be the weight
of authority, not a few courts hold that mere acceptance and use of
goods after full knowledge of the defects is not sufficient to waive
the buyer's right to sue on an implied warranty as to patent defects
Baer v. Mobile Cooperage,& Box Mfg. Co., 49 So. 92; Wood & Co.
v. Val Blatz Breweing Co., 240 Pac. 115, or on an express warranty
Lorraine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Mfg. Co., 234 Pac. 1055; Keith v. Fowler
273 S. W. 706. The rule is quite settled that an implied or an express
warranty as to latent defects in goods delivered is not waived in
favor of the vendor by acceptance and use of goods, Health Dry Gas
Co. v. Hurd, 108 N. Y. S. 410.
L. M. S.
TITLE TO PROPERTY OF BANKRUPTs--Life Insurance Policy.-Policies were taken out on the life of the vicepresident and chief stockholder of bankrupt corporation, payable
to a trustee under trust agreement whereby proceeds of policies
on death of insured were to be used to purchase the common
stock of the corporation, to be distributed to the common stockholders pro rata. The right was reserved in the insured to
change the beneficiary at any time and thereby cancel the trust
agreement. The corporation paid all premiums, retained the
policies, and carried the cash surrender value as an asset, with
the knowledge of the insured. Held that the trustee in bankruptcy
of the corporationi is entitled to the cash surrender value of the
policies up to the time the insured exercised the right to change the
beneficiaries after the adjudication. MacLaren v. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
of N. Y. (D. C., Minn.), 8 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 216.

